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MEDICARE ADVANTAGE: WHAT ARE WE TRYING TO ACHIEVE 
ANYWAY?* 
TIMOTHY D. MCBRIDE** 
 By one summary measure, the Medicare Advantage (MA) plans created 
by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act 
(MMA) of 20031 are a big success.  Almost one in five Medicare 
beneficiaries elected to enroll in private MA plans in 2007.2  Enrollment 
grew almost 40% in just two years, from 4.9 million persons in 2005 to 8.1 
million in 2007.3  The MA Program, under Part C of the Medicare Program, 
is the latest reinvention of the original Medicare risk contract program, 
which was established initially in the 1970s and altered in 1997 by the 
legislation that created the Medicare+Choice (M+C) Program.4  The MA 
Program provides an alternative for Medicare recipients, who can choose 
between the traditional Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) program and an MA 
plan.5 
 
* Editor's Note: Dr. McBride spoke on this topic at the 2007 Saint Louis University Health Law 
Symposium on Medicare After the Medicare Modernization Act. Other articles based on this 
symposium were published in the inaugural issue of the Saint Louis University Journal of Health 
Law & Policy. 
** Professor, Saint Louis University School of Public Health. 
 1. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. 
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. & 26 U.S.C.). 
 2. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE ADVANTAGE IN 2007, at 8 (2007), 
at www.cms.hhs.gov/MCRAdvPartDEnrolData/ (download Medicare Advantage 2007 
Overview; then follow Medicare Advantage in 2007 icon) (last visited June 24, 2008) 
[hereinafter CMS 2007]; see also THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE ADVANTAGE 
(MA) PLAN PENETRATION 2007, at www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=329& 
cat=6 (last visited June 24, 2008) (listing percent enrollment in Medicare Advantage plans in 
each state as well as the national percent of Medicare Advantage enrollments). 
 3. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, A DATA BOOK: HEALTHCARE SPENDING AND THE 
MEDICARE PROGRAM 153 (2007), available at www.medpac.gov/documents/Jun07DataBook_ 
Entire_report.pdf (last visited June 23, 2008) [hereinafter MEDPAC, A DATA BOOK]. 
 4. STAFF OF THE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE HOUSE 
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, app. E, at E-2 (2004), available at http://waysand 
means.house.gov/media/pdf/greenbook2003/AppendixE.pdf (last visited June 24, 2008) 
[hereinafter GREEN BOOK]. 
 5. Id. 
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Congress explicitly established the goals of the M+C Program when it 
enacted the 1997 Balanced Budget Act (BBA), which replaced the Medicare 
risk contract program with the M+C Program.6  The two primary goals 
Congress identified for the M+C Program were to (1) “allow beneficiaries to 
have access to a wide array of private health plan choices in addition to 
traditional fee-for-service Medicare” and (2) “enable the Medicare program 
to utilize innovations that have helped the private market contain costs and 
expand health care delivery options.”7  In other words, the goals of the 
M+C Program, according to the legislators who created it, were to expand 
choices and contain costs. 
This Article confronts the following question: What are we really trying to 
achieve with Medicare Advantage?  Are we trying to achieve the expanded 
choice and cost containment goals, and, if so, how well does the current 
MA Program achieve these goals?  Are there other goals implicit in the 
adoption of the MA legislation that Congress is trying to achieve?  In 
particular, this Article asserts that an additional primary goal of the 1997 
legislation was to increase equity among beneficiaries.  Using legislative 
history and recent empirical evidence, this Article explores the extent to 
which the legislative and other goals for the MA Program have been 
achieved. 
I.  MEDICARE ADVANTAGE: HISTORY AND PROGRESS ON GOALS 
The MA Program was created as part of the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA)8  to replace the M+C 
Program, which was part of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) signed 
by President Clinton.9  The M+C Program’s creators designed M+C to 
manage the perceived problems of the Medicare risk contract program, 
which began in 1982 and primarily focused on Medicare health 
maintenance organizations (HMOs).10 
At-risk and cost-based HMOs entered the Medicare program in the 
1970s with payment rates set at 95% of adjusted average per capita cost 
(AAPCC), i.e., 95% of the total Medicare FFS expenses per person living in 
a given county.11  By 1995, the HMO plans active in Medicare were 
 
 6. Id. 
 7. H.R. REP. NO. 105-149, at 1251 (1997), as reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 176, 
205-06). 
 8. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396w-21 to 1395w-29 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). 
 9. CMS 2007, supra note 2, at 8. 
 10. Id.; GREEN BOOK, supra note 4, at E-2. 
 11. GREEN BOOK, supra note 4, at E-18 n.7; THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 
MEDICARE FACT SHEET: MEDICARE ADVANTAGE (2007), available at www.kff.org/medicare/ 
upload/2052-10.pdf (last visited June 24, 2008) [hereinafter MEDICARE ADVANTAGE FACT 
SHEET]. 
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concentrated in high AAPCC counties that had strong regional and urban 
bias.12  Beneficiaries in those counties were able to purchase plans that 
provided extra benefits at little or no cost.13  This situation raised equity 
concerns across regions and between urban and rural areas. 
The M+C Program established new forms of Medicare managed care 
plans, including preferred provider organizations (PPOs), provider-
sponsored organizations (PSOs), medical savings accounts (MSAs), and 
private fee-for-service plans (PFFS).14  In addition, the 1997 BBA set the 
rural floor payment at $415 per member per month (pmpm), raising 
payments in some counties by more than $100 pmpm.15  The Benefits 
Improvement and Protection Act of 2000 (BIPA)16 increased floor payments 
again from $415 to $475.17  The BIPA also created an urban floor payment 
of $525.18 
An important fact to recall is that creating the M+C Program was part 
of a larger debate in 1997 to balance the budget, which led to the BBA’s 
passage.19  Thus, the larger goal of the BBA was to reduce the budget 
 
 12. See Timothy D. McBride, Disparities in Access to Medicare Managed Care Plans and 
Their Benefits, 17 HEALTH AFF. 170, 174 (1998); see also Carl Serrato et al., Why Do So Few 
HMOs Offer Medicare Risk Plans in Rural Areas?, 17 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 85, 85-87 (1995) 
(discussing uneven distribution of HMOs between rural and urban areas). 
 13. See McBride, supra note 12, at 175 (explaining that “plans in areas with low AAPCC 
rates offer[ed] lower-cost preventive care benefits, while plans in counties with high AAPCC 
rates offer[ed] a much wider array of benefits”); see also MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY 
COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 112 (2001), available at 
www.medpac.gov/documents/Mar01%20Entire%20report.pdf (last visited June 23, 2008) 
[hereinafter MEDPAC 2001]; see also Bryan Dowd & Roger Feldman, Having It All: National 
Benefit Equity and Local Payment Parity in Medicare, 21 HEALTH AFF. 208, 208 (2002) (stating 
that the “wide variation in HMO payments . . . resulted in wide variation in the availability of 
HMO plans and the benefits they offered”); Joan D. Penrod et al., Geographic Variation in 
Determinants of Medicare Managed Care Enrollment, 36 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 733, 748 
(2001) (noting the 1999 amendments to the BBA that allowed “plans to vary the benefits and 
premiums within their service area to reflect variation in costs and Medicare payment”). 
 14. GREEN BOOK, supra note 4, at E-3; MEDICARE ADVANTAGE FACT SHEET, supra note 11. 
 15. ANDREW F. COBURN ET AL., RURAL POLICY RES. INST., MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLANS IN 
RURAL AMERICA 1 (2007), available at www.rupri.org/Forms/HealthPanelBrief3.pdf (last visited 
June 24, 2008). 
 16. Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 
2763A-554 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 17. 42 U.S.C. 1396w-23(c) (2000); CMS 2007, supra note 2, at 6; COBURN ET AL., supra 
note 15. 
 18. 42 U.S.C. 1396w-32(c); CMS 2007, supra note 2, at 6; COBURN ET AL., supra note 
15. 
 19. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-217, at 1, 21, 582-95 (1997), as reprinted in 1997 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 176, 203-16 (Establishment of MedicarePlus/Medicare Choice Program, 
Conference Agreement); see also Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 
Stat. 251 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C. (2000)). 
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deficit and growth in federal spending.20  Medicare risk plans became a 
target for budget reduction, in part, because of studies showing that 
Medicare “overpaid” some HMOs.21 
Why were Medicare risk plans perceived to be “overpaid”?  First, 
because of “self-selection” into Medicare HMOs by younger, healthier 
Medicare recipients, the costs of the Medicare risk plan enrollees were lower 
than the costs of traditional Medicare FFS program enrollees.22  Second, 
payment to Medicare risk plans was based on an arcane reliance on prior 
Medicare FFS payments that perpetuated historical payment patterns based 
on prior utilization of Medicare benefits.23  The prior utilization patterns were 
well known to be based on geographic and regional differences, and these 
differences in payment perpetuated.24  As a result of these two factors, 
researchers estimated that, by 1996, Medicare was paying perhaps 7% 
more than cost to HMOs.25 
 
 20. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE 
PAYMENT POLICY 117 (2000), available at www.medpac.gov/documents/Mar00%20Entire 
%20report%20.pdf (last visited June 24, 2008) (stating that one of Congress’ explicit goals 
when it created M+C as part of the BBA was “to help control the growth in Medicare 
spending”). 
 21. Gerald Riley et al., Health Status of Medicare Enrollees in HMOs and Fee-for-Service 
in 1994, 17 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 65, 73 (1996); see also Randall S. Brown et al., Do Health 
Maintenance Organizations Work for Medicare?, 15 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 7, 18 (1993) 
(“[T]he primary goal of the risk program—to reduce costs to HCFA [Health Care Financing 
Administration]—ha[d] not been realized . . . [because] capitation payments [to HMOs] for the 
month of June 1992 [were] about $31 million more than HCFA would have spent in FFS 
reimbursements for the 1.4 million enrollees.”); Jonathan Gardner, Study: Medicare Risk 
HMOs Overpaid, 26 MOD. HEALTHCARE 8, 8 (Aug. 19, 1996) (discussing overpayments to 
HMOs discovered by the HCFA study and an evaluation by Mathematica Policy Research); 
Press Release, Health Care Fin. Admin., Medicare Risk HMOs Experiencing Favorable 
Selection (Aug. 13, 1996), at www.hhs.gov/news/press/1996pres/960813.html (last visited 
June 24, 2008) (stating that a study by HCFA found that “Medicare may be overpaying some 
health maintenance organizations because the current payment formula does not take into 
account enrollees’ better-than-average health status”). 
 22. Brown et al., supra note 21, at 8, 10; Riley et al., supra note 21, at 65-66, 73. 
 23. See Riley et al., supra note 21, at 73-74 (stating that “[w]hen several dimensions of 
health status were controlled for, the average predicted costs of HMO enrollees were only 85 
percent of average predicted costs for respondents in FFS” and that the “use of models based 
on FFS data to impute costs for HMO enrollees may produce biased estimates if coefficients 
on the health-status variables used in the models are different for individuals choosing the 
HMO and FFS sectors”); Brown et al., supra note 21, at 10-11. 
 24. See GREEN BOOK, supra note 4, at E-13 (stating that enrollment patterns vary 
between urban and rural locations as well as by region). 
 25. Gardner, supra note 21, at 8 (reporting that an HCFA Office of Research and 
Demonstration study found that “Medicare may be overpaying HMOs by as much as 7% 
because the managed-care plans attract a healthier population”); Riley et al., supra note 21, 
at 73; Press Release, Health Care Fin. Admin., supra note 21. 
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In addition to perceiving that Medicare risk plans were overpaid, many 
also perceived a significant “equity” problem between rural and urban 
areas.26  That is, persons living in urban areas were more likely to have 
access to Medicare risk plans, to be enrolled in them, and to receive more 
generous benefits.27  For example, Medicare HMOs offered an array of 
benefits not offered by Medicare FFS.  In 1996, 83% of risk-plan enrollees 
in urban counties had access to prescription drug coverage, 56% had 
access to dental coverage, 94% had access to eye exam coverage, and 
almost all had access to plans offering preventive care.28  The evidence 
suggests that these disparities were due almost entirely to higher payment 
rates in urban areas than in rural areas.29  This perceived “equity” problem 
in Medicare’s risk contract program led to a huge lobbying campaign on 
behalf of rural interests to fix the problem.30 
The policy prescription Congress chose to include in the 1997 BBA was 
to create a Byzantine and complicated policy proposal that would reduce 
payments to higher payment areas over time by “blending” national and 
local rates.31  By blending (or averaging) the rates, the BBA raised the 
payment rates in areas where the local rate was lower than the national 
average and lowered the rates in areas where the local rate was higher than 
the national average.32  In addition, the 2000 BIPA legislation created 
artificial “floor” rates based on population and location, not on prior 
 
 26. See MEDPAC 2001, supra note 13, at 112, 114 (describing the inequality existing 
between rural and urban areas); see also Dowd & Feldman, supra note 13, at 209, 
211(describing the geographic inequities); McBride, supra note 12 (discussing how the risk 
plans, premium amounts, and benefits offered to Medicare beneficiaries vary according to 
areas of residence); Penrod et al., supra note 13 (discussing geographic variations in 
Medicare HMO availability and enrollment). 
 27. McBride, supra note 12, at 174-75. 
 28. Id. at 176 tbl.2. 
 29. See id. at 177; CMS 2007, supra note 2, at 6. 
 30. See, e.g., Serrato et al., supra note 12, at 95-97 (examining why “so few HMOs offer 
a Medicare risk plan in rural counties” and suggesting proposals for how HCFA could 
increase the offerings of risk plans in rural areas); JEANNE M. LAMBREW & BECKY BRIESACHER, 
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG LEGISLATION: WHAT IT MEANS FOR RURAL 
BENEFICIARIES (2003), available at www.gwumc.edu/sphhs/healthpolicy/chsrp/downloads/ 
ruralreport.pdf (last visited June 24, 2008) (advocating for rural beneficiaries prior to the 
passage of the 2003 MMA); THOMAS C. RICKETTS, N.C. RURAL HEALTH RESEARCH & POLICY 
ANALYSIS CTR., ARGUING FOR RURAL HEALTH IN MEDICARE: A PROGRESSIVE RHETORIC FOR RURAL 
AMERICA 5, 10, 12 (2002), available at www.shepscenter.unc.edu/research_programs/rural_ 
program/wp75.pdf (last visited June 24, 2008) (discussing the role of effective advocacy in 
developing rural policy). 
 31. GREEN BOOK, supra note 4, at E-19 to -20. 
 32. See id. 
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Medicare costs, that ended up being operative in most rural areas in the 
United States.33 
II.  WE RAISED RATES, BUT DID THEY COME?  THE MEDICARE+CHOICE EXPERIENCE 
As noted above, the 1997 BBA provisions that created the M+C 
Program restructured the method for computing capitation rates paid to 
M+C plans beginning in January 1998.34  The changes to the policy for 
setting plan payment rates were much anticipated partly because of the new 
rates’ potential to spur managed care growth in areas that previously had 
lower rates, especially rural areas.35  Despite this expectation, the number of 
M+C plans started to decline dramatically, falling from 346 plans in 1998 
to 145 plans in 2004.36  Nevertheless, beneficiary enrollment in M+C plans 
still increased until 2000 because the plans that exited the program tended 
to have low enrollment.37  In 2000, however, enrollment started to decline 
when plans with larger enrollment started to withdraw.38  By December 
2003, enrollment had dropped to 4.6 million (from its peak of 6.4 million in 
1999).39  Rural M+C enrollment declined precipitously as well during this 
period—after peaking at just over 260,000 in 1999, enrollment fell to 
176,058 in December 2003.40 
Should policy makers have been able to predict these withdrawals from 
M+C plans?  Well, yes.  It was not surprising that plans exited M+C in 
urban areas, where the 1997 BBA slowed growth in payment rates.  Part of 
the decline in M+C enrollment stemmed from nonrenewal by plans.41  From 
1999 through early 2001, “[a] considerable number of M+C plans either 
dropped out of Medicare completely or reduced their service areas,” 
affecting a reported 2.4 million enrollees (about 407,000 in 1999, about 
327,000 in 2000, about 934,000 in 2001, about 536,000 in 2002, and 
 
 33. Id. at E-20. 
 34. Id. at E-18 to -20; COBURN ET AL., supra note 15. 
 35. Penrod et al., supra note 13, at 733-34. 
 36. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE FACT SHEET: MEDICARE ADVANTAGE 
(2004), available at www.kff.org/medicare/upload/Medicare-Advantage-Fact-Sheet.pdf (last 
visited June 24, 2008). 
 37. MEDPAC, A DATA BOOK, supra note 3, at 153 fig.10-3. 
 38. See id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE HEALTH AND PRESCRIPTION DRUG PLAN 
TRACKER, UNITED STATES – RURAL COUNTIES: ENTIRE MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PROFILE, MEDICARE 
ADVANTAGE PLAN ENROLLMENT, at www.kff.org/medicare/healthplantracker/georesults.jsp?r= 
2&pt=8&yo=2&c=&i=&n=1#6 (last visited June 20, 2008); COBURN ET AL., supra note 15, 
at 2. 
 41. Timothy D. McBride & Courtney Andrews, An Update on Medicare+Choice: Rural 
Medicare Beneficiaries Enrolled in Medicare+Choice Plans Through October 2000, RURAL 
POLICY BRIEF (RUPRI Ctr. for Rural Health Policy Analysis, Omaha, Neb.), Mar. 2001, at 1, 3. 
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about 215,000 in 2003).42  However, in rural areas, the payment rates to 
the M+C plans did increase due to implementation of the national payment 
floor, but the plans did not come.43  Although plans attributed their 
departure from M+C to sluggish growth in payment rates, other factors, 
such as a weakening HMO market in general, most likely contributed to 
these declines.44  The nonrenewals had a disproportionate impact on rural 
beneficiaries.  For example, “[w]hile only about 3.7% of M+C enrollees 
lived in rural areas, a much larger proportion of rural persons were affected 
by exits in the 1999-2001 period: 14% [of the nonrenewals were in rural 
areas] in 1999, 12% in 2000, and 7% in 2001.”45  Only in 2002 did the 
nonrenewals “seem to fall proportionately on rural residents, when 3.5% of 
persons affected by [nonrenewals] were from rural areas.”46 
III.  THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO M+C: MEDICARE ADVANTAGE UNDER THE 
2003 MMA 
Despite the turmoil in the M+C Program, President Bush and 
Republicans in Congress decided they could not simply let private plans die 
because they had a long-term goal of enhancing private choices as 
alternatives to traditional Medicare.47  In 2003, President Bush said, 
“Medicare beneficiaries should be given more choices in how they receive 
their heath care . . . [and] seniors who want more choices and better 
benefits . . . will have the right to select the health plan that fits their needs 
 
 42. Id.; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., M+C ENROLLEES BY COUNTY FOR CY 
2002, at www.cms.hhs.gov/NonRenewal/ (last visited June 24, 2008) (download Non-
Renewal Reports, follow Affected Enrollees by State, County, and Plan – CY2002 icon, follow 
markprintoutnew icon); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., M+C ENROLLEES BY COUNTY 
FOR CY 2003, at www.cms.hhs.gov/NonRenewal/ (last visited June 24, 2008) (download 
Non-Renewal Reports, follow Affected Enrollees by State, County, and Plan – CY2003 icon). 
 43. See CMS 2007, supra note 2, at 6 (discussing rate increases); see also Joseph R. 
Antos, Medicare+Choice: Where Did the Scorekeepers Go Wrong?, 2001 HEALTH AFF. (WEB 
EXCL.) w83 (discussing the reasons for the lack of increased plans after the rate increases). 
 44. See Antos, supra note 43, at w83-84 (saying that plans consider the conditions of the 
commercial market as one of several factor s when deciding whether to participate in M+C); 
Penrod et al., supra note 13, at 747 (explaining that market characteristics such as enrollment 
in non-Medicare HMOs influence payment rates). 
 45. Timothy McBride et al., An Update on Medicare+Choice: Rural Medicine 
Beneficiaries Enrolled in Medicare+Choice Plans Through September 2001, RURAL POLICY 
BRIEF (RUPRI Ctr. for Rural Health Policy Analysis, Omaha, Neb.), Aug. 2002, at 1, 4, 
available at www.unmc.edu/ruprihealth/Pubs/pb2002-4.pdf (last visited June 23, 2008). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See AMERICA’S HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS, THE VALUE OF PRIVATE HEALTH CARE CHOICES 
IN MEDICARE 17 (2005), available at www.medicarechoices.org/files/ValueofPrivateHealthCare 
ChoicesinMedicareOct2005.pdf (last visited June 24, 2008) (showing that both Republicans 
and Democrats “worked together to win congressional approval of reforms to stabilize private 
health care choices in Medicare”). 
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best-rather than a one-size-fits-all government plan.”48  While the need to 
address the M+C Program’s problems afforded an opportunity to promote 
more private choices in Medicare, the idea was not new.  In 1995 while 
serving as Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich said, “Now let me talk a 
little bit about Medicare . . . We believe it’s going to wither on the vine 
because people are voluntarily going to leave it.”49 
Thus, in 2003, Congress passed the MMA.50  Among other provisions, 
the MMA (1) renamed the M+C Program as the Medicare Advantage (MA) 
Program, (2) created a new MA option (regional PPOs that offered a new 
plan anywhere in the region in 2006 or 2007 were required to offer the 
same plan everywhere in the region), (3) created MA Prescription Drug 
Plans, and (4) raised the MA plan payment rates.51  The MMA affected plan 
payment rates in several ways.  It increased payments for MA plans across 
the board through provisions guaranteeing plan payment rates equal to at 
least 100% of the payment that would be made under the fee-for-service 
program.52  The MMA also increased floor rates again to $613 for urban 
counties and $555 for all other counties.53  “The MMA established a new 
payment adjustment for risk by using risk corridors around the benchmark 
payment so that aggregate losses and gains are shared between the 
Medicare program and the plan.”54  Additionally, the MMA repealed the 
BBA’s “budget neutrality” provisions,55 which had reduced growth of 
payment rates over time to M+C plans.56  Collectively, the payment 
changes in the MMA led to significant increases in payments to MA plans.  
Based on January 2004 data, in most areas of the country payment 
increases would exceed 8% and the average increase would be 11.5%.57  In 
 
 48. THE WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: FRAMEWORK TO MODERNIZE AND IMPROVE MEDICARE, at 
MORE CHOICES-INCLUDING THE CHOICE TO STAY IN TRADITIONAL MEDICARE (2003), at 
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030304-1.html (last visited June 24, 2008). 
 49. Gingrich on Medicare, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1996, § 1, at 8 (citing House Speaker 
Newt Gingrich, speech at a Blue Cross/Blue Shield conference on Oct. 24, 1995). 
 50. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. 
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. & 26 U.S.C.). 
 51. CMS 2007, supra note 2, at 5-7; COBURN ET AL., supra note 15, at 2; MEDICARE 
ADVANTAGE FACT SHEET, supra note 11. 
 52. CMS 2007, supra note 2, at 6. 
 53. Id. 
 54. COBURN ET AL., supra note 15, at 2. 
 55. CMS 2007, supra note 2, at 6. 
 56. See id. at 5, 6, & 22; McBride et al., supra note 45. 
 57. The author calculated these increases from data contained in the Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services MA ratebook for January and February 2004. This ratebook 
can be downloaded at Ctrs.  For Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Ratebooks & Supporting Data, 
www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/RSD/list.asp#TopOfPage (last visited June 
22, 2008). 
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the counties where the rate is now set by the fee-for-service rate, the 
payment rate would rise by an average of 17.7%.58 
Congressional reformers expected the payment rate increases to lead to 
new MA plan activity—e.g., the creation of new MA plans, or the expansion 
of service areas for existing MA plans—across the United States, including 
rural areas.59 
A. Response to the MMA: Growth in the MA Program from 2005 to 2007 
During the first three quarters of 2007, MA plan enrollment grew over 
50% and has more than tripled since the program’s launch in early 2006.60  
In September 2007, more than 845,000 rural Medicare beneficiaries were 
enrolled in an MA plan, which represents a 56% increase since December 
2006 and a 230% increase since December 2005.61  Furthermore, as 
shown in Figure 1, MA plan enrollment in all counties rose to about 8.3 
million, an increase of 42% since December 2005.62 
 
 58. See id. 
 59. H.R. REP. NO. 108-391, at  524, 527, as reprinted in  2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1808, 
1896, 1899 (stating that Title II of the MMA “modernizes and revitalizes private plans under 
Medicare”); see also AMERICA’S HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS, supra note 47, at 9 (“Medicare 
Advantage plans have been using these new funds to reduce costs and enhance benefits for 
beneficiaries.”); Robert H. Bradner, The New Medicare: A Detailed Guide to the Just-Enacted 
Prescription Drug Legislation, ABA HEALTH ESOURCE, June 2004. 
 60. Timothy D. McBride & Keith J. Mueller, Update on Rural Enrollment in Medicare 
Advantage: Growth Continues, RURAL POLICY BRIEF (RUPRI Ctr. for Rural Health Policy Analysis, 
Omaha, Neb.), October 2007, at 1, available at www.unmc.edu/ruprihealth/Pubs/PB2007-
7%20110507.pdf (last visited June 24, 2008). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
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Figure 1: MA Plan Enrollment and Contracts, 1985–200763 
(as of December of Year Shown) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, despite significant growth in MA plans, from 160 in 2004 to 
472 in 2007 (see Figure 1), as Figure 2 shows, only 9.3% of Medicare 
eligibles in rural areas were enrolled in MA plans in September 2007, 
compared to 19% of all Medicare eligibles.64 
Figure 2: MA Enrollment by Area of Residence, September 200765 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 shows that, as of September 2007, “[o]ver half (56%) of rural 
persons enrolled in MA or prepaid plans were in private fee-for-service 
 
 63. The information in this graph comes from the Medicare Advantage Monthly Reports 
and includes risk plans prior to 1997 and CCP and PFFS plans only after 1997. See Ctrs. for 
Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Monthly Enrollment and Contract Summary Reports, available at 
www.cms.hhs.gov/MCRAdvPartDEnrolData/MCESR/list.asp#TopOfPage (last visited Aug. 24, 
2008). 
 64. McBride & Mueller, supra note 60, at 1. 
 65. Id. at 3 tbl.1, 4 tbl.2. 
 
 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] MEDICARE ADVANTAGE 415 
(PFFS) plans, compared to only 15% of urban persons.”66  Conversely, 
urban persons are much more likely to enroll in HMO plans.  In September 
2007, 71% of urban area enrollment was in HMO plans, a high rate 
despite having fallen from 84% in 2005 (see Figure 3).67 
Figure 3: Enrollment in MA and Other “Prepaid” Plans, September 200768 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV.  MEDICARE ADVANTAGE: HAVE WE ACHIEVED PROGRAM GOALS? 
Has the United States achieved the MA Program’s original goals to (1) 
expand healthcare delivery options for seniors by giving them access to 
private plan choices, (2) contain the growth of Medicare costs through these 
options, and (3) reduce equity problems (the implicit goal of the 1997 BBA, 
as described above)? 
A. Do MA Plans Expand Choice? 
The choice expansion goal has been met by one measure because, as 
of 2007, essentially every Medicare beneficiary in the country can choose 
an MA plan.69  In 2005, only 84% of beneficiaries had an MA plan 
option.70  In 2007, however, every urban beneficiary could choose an MA 
plan, and over 94% of beneficiaries living in rural areas had at least one 
MA plan they could choose.71  However, is the mere availability of an MA 
plan the right measure for determining whether seniors have access to 
 
 66. Id. at 1. 
 67. Id. 
 68. RUPRI Ctr. for Rural Health Policy Analysis, Table 3. Enrollment in Medicare 
Advantage and Other Prepaid Plans by Location, 2005-2007, available at www.unmc.edu/ 
ruprihealth/Pubs/PB2007-7%20Tables%20110507.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2008). 
 69. MEDPAC, A DATA BOOK, supra note 3, at 151 fig.10-1. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Marsha Gold, Medicare Advantage in 2006-2007: What Congress Intended? 2007 
HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.) w445, w447; Press Release, Health Affairs, Growth in Private Fee-for-
Service Plans Accounts for Much of the Increase in Choice Among Medicare Advantage Plans 
(May 1, 2007), at www.healthaffairs.org/press/mayjun0703.htm (last visited June 24, 2008). 
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“expanded delivery options”?  This increased plan availability is illusory for 
at least three reasons. 
First, beneficiaries have an increased choice offered among different 
types of insurance plans with different financial structures,72 but not 
necessarily an expanded choice of providers.  In fact, the greatest freedom 
to choose providers is offered in traditional Medicare FFS.  MA plans 
(especially HMOs) actually restrict choice because beneficiaries must choose 
from a provided list of doctors and hospitals.  Thus, beneficiaries have the 
option of choosing among plans with more benefits offered, as opposed to 
a choice of more providers.  An estimate from the Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services shows that the extra benefits from MA plans amount to 
almost $108 per member per month and that $86 of that extra benefit is 
financed by payments from the Medicare Program and $22, on average, is 
financed by extra premiums levied on recipients.73  The extra benefits offered 
include routine physical exams (offered by 96% of plans), additional acute 
care (87%) or long-term skilled nursing facility days covered in the hospital 
(90%), eye exams (77%), ear exams (76%), eyeglasses (64%), and hearing 
aids (61%).74  In addition, 70% of MA plans offer access to a prescription 
drug plan that does not require beneficiaries to pay a premium for the 
coverage.75 
 
 72. See Timothy D. McBride et al., Rural Enrollment in Medicare Advantage Is 
Concentrated in Private Fee-for-Service Plans, RURAL POLICY BRIEF (RUPRI Ctr. for Rural Health 
Policy Analysis, Omaha, Neb.), Apr. 2007, at 1, 2, 4 tbl.3, available at www.unmc.edu/ 
ruprihealth/Pubs/PB2007-2.pdf (last visited June 20, 2008) (stating that “MA and prepaid 
enrollment in rural areas is concentrated in a few organizations holding contracts with CMS” 
and “[t]he top three contracts in rural areas are PFFS contracts, enrolling 38% of the rural 
enrollees in MA and prepaid plans”). 
 73. CMS 2007, supra note 2, at 11; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., OVERVIEW 
OF THE MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PROGRAM 2 (2007), at www.cms.hhs.gov/ 
MCRAdvPartDEnrolData/ (download Medicare Advantage 2007 Overview; then follow MA 
Backgrounder icon) (last visited June 23, 2008); see also CTR. FOR HEALTH POLICY STUDIES, THE 
HERITAGE FOUND., A MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PRIMER 5 (2007), available at www.heritage.org/ 
research/HealthCare/upload/HeritageMedicareAdvantageprimer.pdf (last visited June 24, 
2008). 
 74. CMS 2007, supra note 2, at 14. 
 75. Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Medicare Advantage Plans 
Provide Lower Costs and Substantial Savings: CMS Announces Increased Payment Rates for 
Medicare Advantage Plans in 2007 (Apr. 3, 2006), at www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/ 
release.asp?Counter=1825 (last visited June 24, 2008); see also BRIAN BILES ET AL., THE 
COMMONWEALTH FUND, MEDICARE BENEFICIARY OUT-OF-POCKET COSTS: ARE MEDICARE 
ADVANTAGE PLANS A BETTER DEAL? 3 (2006), available at www.cmwf.org/usr_doc/927_Biles_ 
MedicarebeneOOPcosts_MA_ib.pdf (last visited June 24, 2008) (citing prescription drug plan 
availability as evidence that additional payments to MA plans has allowed them to offer more 
benefits). 
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Second, in most of the country (especially in rural counties), the 
“predominant” alternative to traditional Medicare FFS is the private fee-for-
service (PFFS) MA plan.76  The PFFS plan is a type of FFS plan, so it does 
not differ much in terms of provider choice from traditional Medicare FFS.  
In 2003, the majority of counties had zero or one private plans.77  As of 
2007, most counties have several PFFS plans.78  However, while 87% of 
urban persons have access to an HMO plan, only 35% of rural persons 
have access to an HMO plan.79 
Third, the recent passage of the MMA is limited in its provisions of 
expanded prescription drug coverage.  Since prescription drug coverage 
under Medicare was previously only available previously through M+C 
plans,80 the coverage expansions creating the Medicare Part D program 
amount to an expansion that was tried already through M+C.  However, 
drug coverage as an additional “choice” offered by MA plans is becoming 
obsolete because prescription drug coverage is now available to all 
Medicare recipients. 
B. Do MA Plans Contain Costs? 
Although the MA plans were designed to reduce Medicare spending, 
especially the growth in Medicare spending, evidence emerged in 2007 
showing that, on average, MA plans were paid 112% of the mean costs of 
 
 76. MEDPAC, A DATA BOOK, supra note 3, at 246; see THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND., MEDICARE HEALTH AND PRESCRIPTION DRUG PLAN TRACKER, UNITED STATES – RURAL 
COUNTIES: MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES WITH ACCESS TO MA CONTRACTS, BY PLAN TYPE, at 
www.kff.org/medicare/healthplantracker/georesults.jsp?r=2&yo=2&n=1&i=3&pt=8 (last 
visited June 16, 2008) (showing that, as of 2007, 100% of rural beneficiaries have access to 
a PFFS plan); see also McBride et al., supra note 72, at 2 (“Despite the new option of a 
regional PPO, virtually all growth in MA plans in rural areas in 2006 was in PFFS plans.”). 
 77. See GREEN BOOK, supra note 4, at E-9, E-10 tbl.E-3 (stating that in January 2003, 
“41 percent of all Medicare beneficiaries lived in an area that had no access to an M+C  
plan” and 19% had access to only one M+C plan). 
 78. See Timothy McBride et al., supra note 72, at 2, 4. 
 79. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE HEALTH AND PRESCRIPTION DRUG PLAN 
TRACKER, UNITED STATES – RURAL COUNTIES: ENTIRE MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PROFILE, MEDICARE 
BENEFICIARIES WITH ACCESS TO MA CONTRACTS, BY PLAN TYPE, at www.kff.org/medicare/health 
plantracker/georesults.jsp?r=2&pt=8&yo=2&c=&i=&n=1#6 (last visited June 16, 2008); 
THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE HEALTH AND PRESCRIPTION DRUG PLAN TRACKER, 
UNITED STATES – URBAN COUNTIES: ENTIRE MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PROFILE, MEDICARE 
BENEFICIARIES WITH ACCESS TO MA CONTRACTS, BY PLAN TYPE, at www.kff.org/medicare/health 
plantracker/georesults.jsp?r=3&n=&i=&c=&pt=8&yo=2&x=9&y=11 (last visited June 20, 
2008). 
 80. See GREEN BOOK, supra note 4, at E-39 (explaining that one advantage of Medicare 
managed care over traditional FFS Medicare is that most plans offer some prescription drug 
coverage). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
418 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:405 
covering a traditional Medicare recipient.81  PFFS plans were the most 
overpaid, receiving payments equal to 119% of traditional Medicare FFS 
costs.82  In addition, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that 
if MA plans were paid at 100% of FFS costs, then Medicare spending would 
be reduced by “$54 billion over the 2009-2012 period and $149 billion 
over the 2009-2017 period.”83  This potential for cost savings inspired 
Representative Pete Stark and others to propose this legislative change in 
2007.84 
As indicated in the discussion above, the higher payment to MA plans 
results from a series of payment policy changes, the most recent changes 
being made by the MMA.  Before the MMA, private Medicare plans were 
paid, on average, 4% above traditional FFS costs.85  However, the MMA led 
to significant payment increases to MA plans that exceeded 8% in most 
areas of the country and eventually to an average increase of about 12%.86 
 
 81. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT 
POLICY 244 tbl.4-1 (2007), available at www.medpac.gov/documents/Mar07_Entire 
Report.pdf (last visited June 24, 2008) [hereinafter MEDPAC 2007]. 
 82. Id.; see also Medicare Payment Advisory Commission’s Annual March Report: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 110th Cong. 13 (2007) 
(statement of Glenn M. Hackbarth, Chairman of the Medicare Payment Advisory 
Commission), available at www.medpac.gov/documents/030107_Testimony_Mar07_ 
report.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2008) [hereinafter Hackbarth Testimony]. 
 83. J. TIMOTHY GRONNIGER & ROBERT A. SUNSHINE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, 
MEDICARE ADVANTAGE: PRIVATE HEALTH PLANS IN MEDICARE 6 (2007), available at 
www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/82xx/doc8268/06-28-Medicare_Advantage.pdf  (last visited June 24, 
2008); Medicare Advantage and the Federal Budget: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the 
Budget, 110th Cong. 13 (2007) (testimony of Peter Orszag, Director of the Congressional 
Budget Office), available at www.budget.house.gov/hearings/2007/06.27orszag_ 
testimony.pdf (last visited June 24, 2008). 
 84. Rep. Stark to Introduce Bill to Reduce Reimbursements for Medicare Advantage Plans, 
KAISER DAILY HEALTH POL’Y REP. (The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found.),  Apr. 26, 2007, at 
www.kaisernetwork.org/daily_reports/rep_index.cfm?hint=3&DR_ID=44518 (last visited June 
24, 2008); see Press Release, Congressman Pete Stark, Stark Floor Remarks on Medicare 
Legislation (Dec.. 19, 2007), at www.house.gov/stark/news/110th/pressreleases/2007/2007-
12/19-medicare.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2008) (discussing the CHAMP bill and its proposals 
to reduce overpayments to private plans). 
 85. MEDPAC 2001, supra note 13, at 117 tbl.7-2 (stating that the average M+C 
payment rate as a percent of Medicare FFS spending in 2000 was 104%); see also MEDICARE 
PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 210, 210 
tbl.4.3 (2004), available at www.medpac.gov/documents/Mar04_Entire_reportv3.pdf (last 
visited June 23, 2008) (stating that in 2004, “before MMA . . . Medicare would have paid 
M+C plans an average of 103 percent of what it would cost to cover the current 
demographic mix of M+C enrollees under the traditional FFS Medicare program”) 
[hereinafter MEDPAC 2004]. 
 86. These percentages are based on the author’s analysis of MA plan payment rates as of 
January 2004.  The ratebooks are available on the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 
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Medicare’s private plans were expected originally to lower Medicare 
costs because, at the time they were introduced, the costs of managed care 
plans were lower than the costs of traditional FFS plans.87  This expectation 
was based on the theory established when Congress created the Medicare 
risk contract program, namely to pay Medicare HMOs at 95% of the 
adjusted average per capita cost (AAPCC).88  Thus, the expectation was that 
these plans would cost 5% less than traditional Medicare FFS.  However, the 
current payment rate, 112%89 of traditional Medicare FFS, indicates that 
managed care is not leading to 5% savings but, instead, to 12% higher 
costs.  The Medicare Trustees also confirm that shifting Medicare 
beneficiaries to MA plans does not lead to considerable savings, since they 
currently are assuming that shifting beneficiaries from traditional Medicare 
FFS to MA plans will save just 0.03% annually in the long run.90 
C. Do MA Plans Increase Equity? 
Recall that before the 1997 BBA created the M+C Program, rural areas 
complained that they did not have access to benefit-rich Medicare HMOs.91  
Now essentially every Medicare beneficiary has access to Medicare PFFS 
plans, and enrollment in these plans is growing rapidly.92  However, in terms 
of the equity goal, there are several issues PFFS plans raise.  For example, 
 
Web site, www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/RSD/list.asp#TopOfPage (last 
visited June 24,2008); see also MEDPAC 2004, supra note 85, at 210-11, 210 tbl.4-2 (“For 
2004 under the new MMA rates . . . Medicare is paying M+C plans an average of 107 
percent of what it would cost to cover the current demographic mix of M+C enrollees under 
the traditional fee-for-service Medicare program”). 
 87. See BRIAN BILES ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, THE COST OF PRIVATIZATION: EXTRA 
PAYMENTS TO MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLANS-2005 UPDATE 1-2 (2004), available at 
www.cmwf.org/usr_doc/750_Biles_costofprivatization_update_ib_pdf.pdf (last visited June 24, 
2008). 
 88. See id. at 2; see GREEN BOOK, supra note 4, at E-18 n.7. 
 89. MEDPAC 2007, supra note 81, at 244 tbl.4-1. 
 90. THE BD. OF TRS., FED. HOSP. INS. & FED. SUPPLEMENTARY MED. INS. TRUST FUNDS, THE 
2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARDS OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE AND 
FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 68-69 (2007), available at 
www.cms.hhs.gov/ReportsTrustFunds/downloads/tr2007.pdf (last visited June 24, 2008) 
[hereinafter THE BD. OF TRS. 2007]. 
 91. See supra text accompanying notes 26–30; Dowd & Feldman, supra note 13, at 209, 
211; McBride, supra note 12; Penrod et al., supra note 13; Serrato et al., supra note 12, at 
95-97. 
 92. MEDPAC 2007, supra note 81, at 248; McBride & Mueller, supra note 60; see also 
MEDPAC, A DATA BOOK, supra note 3, at 154 (stating that “enrollment in PFFS plans 
accounted for nearly half the growth in Medicare Advantage” between July 2006 and 
February 2007). 
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PFFS plans generally do not offer an array of additional benefits93—they are 
essentially Medigap plans.94  In addition, both providers and consumer 
advocates lodged a significant number of complaints about PFFS plans 
between 2004 and 2007.  Providers complained about reimbursement 
issues and about “deeming” provisions,95 while consumer advocates 
complained about possible deceptive marketing techniques.96  Furthermore, 
PFFS plans are concentrated in just a few organizations,97 which, in the long 
run, raises concerns about market power. 
In 2007, a new view of equity in MA plans emerged.  Instead of looking 
at horizontal equity across geographical areas, the new view focuses on 
increased vertical equity among recipients98 and concludes that MA plans 
do increase vertical equity because they help lower-income Medicare 
beneficiaries.99  In particular, evidence shows that 49% of MA enrollees had 
incomes of less than $20,000 in 2004100 and that “racial and ethnic 
 
 93. See MEDPAC, A DATA BOOK, supra note 3, at 156 (showing that PFFS plans, for 
example, are not required to offer drug coverage). 
 94. In other words, PFFS plans offer coverage similar to that of plans designed to 
supplement traditional Medicare FFS. 
 95. See, e.g., Patricia Barry, Don’t Fall for the Hard Sell, AARP BULLETIN, October 2007, 
at www.aarp.org/health/insurance/articles/beneficiaries_have.html (last visited June 24, 
2008) (stating that “a doctor or hospital that agrees to treat an enrollee is automatically 
‘deemed’ to have agreed to the plan’s terms and payment conditions—without any 
negotiation” between the provider and the plan having taken place). 
 96. Robert A. Berenson & Melissa A. Goldstein, Will Medicare Wither on the Vine? How 
Congress Has Advantaged Medicare Advantage—And What's a Level Playing Field Anyway?, 
1 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 5, 30-33 (2007). 
 97. McBride & Mueller, supra note 60, at 5 (stating that in 2007 “over 43% of rural 
overall MA enrollment [was] in just five organizations serving about 2,000 counties in the 
United States”); see also McBride et al., supra note 72, at 4 tbl.3 (showing that the three plans 
with the highest enrollment in rural areas are PFFS plans). 
 98. See ROBERT A. BERENSON & BRYAN E. DOWD, AARP PUB. POLICY INST., THE FUTURE OF 
PRIVATE PLAN CONTRACTING IN MEDICARE 6-7 (2002), available at http://assets.aarp.org/ 
rgcenter/health/2002_12_medicare.pdf (last visited June 24, 2008) (stating that “vertical 
equity means that people with different resources should be treated differently”). 
 99. CMS 2007, supra note 2, at 3, 9 (“Fifty-seven percent of MA beneficiaries have 
income between $10,000 and $30,000 as compared to 46 percent of FFS beneficiaries.”). 
 100. An Examination of the Medicare Advantage Program: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on Finance, 110th Cong. 4 (2007) (presentation by the Members of the Health Policy 
Consensus Group), available at www.senate.gov/~finance/hearings/statements/ 
041107cg2.pdf (last visited June 24, 2008) [hereinafter Health Policy Consensus Group 
testimony]; see also ADAM ATHERLY & KENNETH E. THORPE, VALUE OF MEDICARE ADVANTAGE TO 
LOW-INCOME AND MINORITY MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES, BLUE CROSS & BLUE SHIELD ASS’N 4 tbl.2 
(2005), available at www.bcbs.com/issues/medicaid/research/Value-of-Medicare-Advantage-
to-Low-Income-and-Minority-Medicare-Beneficiaries.pdf (last visited June 24, 2008) (showing 
that in 2003, 35.6 % of Medicare beneficiaries with incomes under $10,000 enrolled in MA 
(slightly lower than the 40.3% of beneficiaries with incomes under $10,000 who only enrolled 
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minorities represent 27 percent of total MA enrollment, compared with 20 
percent in fee-for-service.”101  One study predicts that if MA coverage 
ceased to exist, “59% of African-American beneficiaries in counties that 
have MA plans would go without supplemental coverage.”102  As a result of 
these studies, the NAACP opposed reducing funding for MA plans, saying 
they “disproportionately provide coverage to low-income and racial and 
ethnic minority beneficiaries.”103  In addition, a gaggle of policy experts 
concluded that MA plans are “offering more choices of plans, more 
generous benefits, and lower cost-sharing for . . . [s]eniors . . . with modest 
incomes who do not have supplementary coverage.”104  However, 
subsequent analysis showed that this research was misleading and that low-
income and minority Medicare beneficiaries were not more likely to benefit 
from MA plans.105 
V.  IS IT POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE THE GOALS OF MEDICARE ADVANTAGE? 
The conclusions described above create a rather perplexing story.  The 
goals for Medicare private plans were to increase choices, contain costs, 
and increase equity, but, arguably, MA has not achieved any of these goals.  
First, while MA plans expanded choices of insurance plans and some plans 
(especially HMO and PPO plans) offer expanded benefit options, few plans 
expand choice of providers.  Furthermore, the additional choices offered to 
most beneficiaries are PFFS plans, which are not that much unlike traditional 
Medicare FFS in terms of provider choice.  Second, by almost any measure, 
MA plans have not met the cost containment goal.  Finally, the evidence is 
 
in Medicare) and 37.8% of Medicare beneficiaries with incomes from $10,000 to $20,000 
enrolled in MA (slightly higher than the 29.2% of beneficiaries with incomes from $10,000 to 
$20,000 who only enrolled in Medicare)). 
 101. Health Policy Consensus Group testimony, supra note 100. 
 102. ATHERLY & THORPE, supra note 100, at ii, 8. 
 103. Minority Groups Oppose Proposed Reduction in Funds for Medicare Advantage Plans, 
KAISER DAILY HEALTH POL’Y REP., Mar. 16, 2007, at www.kaisernetwork.org/Daily_reports/ 
rep_index.cfm?DR_ID=43645 (last visited June 24, 2008); see also Health Policy Consensus 
Group testimony, supra note 100 (“The NAACP, as well as the League of United Latin 
American Citizens, have called upon congressional leaders to oppose reductions in funding 
for Medicare Advantage plans.”). 
 104. Health Policy Consensus Group testimony, supra note 100, at 6; see also DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HHS BUDGET IN BRIEF 51-52 (2008), available at 
www.hhs.gov/budget/08budget/2008BudgetInBrief.pdf (last visited June 24, 2008). 
 105. EDWIN PARK & ROBERT GREENSTEIN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, LOW-INCOME 
AND MINORITY BENEFICIARIES DO NOT RELY DISPROPORTIONATELY ON MEDICARE ADVANTAGE 
PLANS: INDUSTRY CAMPAIGN TO PROTECT BILLIONS IN OVERPAYMENTS RESTS ON DISTORTIONS 3 
(2007), available at www.cbpp.org/4-3-07health.pdf (last visited June 24, 2008) (stating that 
many of the calculations fail “to include Medicaid and employer-based retiree coverage as 
options that provide supplemental coverage, which distorts the data”). 
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overwhelming that MA plans still have not achieved horizontal equity across 
geographic areas, especially between urban and rural areas.  Met with 
these concerns, the MA Program’s defenders invented a goal of achieving 
vertical equity among recipients, even though it was never a stated goal of 
the program and evidence shows that MA plans do not actually achieve 
vertical equity. 
This history raises a question: Is it really possible to achieve the goals set 
out for the MA Program?  As is often the case in healthcare policy, everyone 
wants everything, everywhere without having to pay additional money for it.  
So what people were really saying in 1982, 1997, and 2003 was, “We 
want a better Medicare plan covering more services with less out of pocket 
costs, like those Medicare HMOs, and, especially, covering outpatient drugs 
at lower costs, like those zero-premium plans offered in Florida.”  And, in 
1997, Congress attempted to achieve these goals through the BBA’s 
“budget neutrality” provisions. 
This expectation’s obviously unrealistic nature leads to the conclusion 
that achieving these illusory goals is simply not feasible.  Since evidence 
now shows that MA plans cost 112% of Medicare FFS, consider what would 
happen if all Medicare beneficiaries, not just 20% of them, as was the case 
in 2007,106  were enrolled in these plans and receiving coverage for more 
of their copayments, deductibles, and, perhaps, prescription drugs, with 
reasonable additional premiums.  This scenario would obviously not save 
money because the costs of providing coverage to the traditional Medicare 
FFS recipients would also rise, perhaps by 15% as already projected.107  
People fight so hard against payment cuts to private plans (in urban areas) 
or to raise payments to private plans (in rural areas) because they want the 
additional benefits.  However, the recent evidence demonstrates that even 
these changes would not achieve the equity goals, either vertical or 
horizontal. 
Regardless of these other goals, we must return to the goal of 
containing aggregate Medicare costs, especially in the long run.  What 
about the Medicare trust funds and the future costs of Medicare?  The future 
costs of the entitlement programs that benefit the elderly—Medicare, 
Medicaid, and Social Security—are projected to more than double, rising 
 
 106. MEDPAC 2007, supra note 81, at 244 tbl.4-1; MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY 
COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 153 (2008), available at 
www.medpac.gov/documents/Mar08_EntireReport.pdf (last visited June 24, 2008). 
 107. See THE BD. OF TRS. 2007, supra note 90, at 52 tbl.III.B.5 (predicting that the total 
expenditures of the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund will increase from $208.2 billion in 2007 to 
$385.4 billion in 2016); BD. OF TRS. OF THE FED. OLD-AGE & SURVIVORS INS. & FED. DISABILITY 
INS. TRUST FUNDS, STATUS OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE PROGRAMS: A SUMMARY OF THE 
2007 ANNUAL SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE TRUST FUND REPORTS (2007), available at 
www.ssa.gov/OACT/TRSUM/tr07summary.pdf (last visited June 24, 2008). 
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from 7.6% of GDP in 2000 to 15% of GDP in 2035.108  Estimates from 
Social Security and Medicare actuaries are that the projected growth in MA 
enrollment, as a percent of beneficiaries, will increase from the current 20% 
to 26% by 2017.109  Since MA enrollees currently cost Medicare an 
additional 12%, this enrollment increase may lead to overall Medicare 
spending being about 3% higher than it otherwise would be,110 especially 
considering that Medicare actuaries are assuming that the shift to managed 
care will not lower costs substantially in the long run.111  MA expenditures 
also result in higher premiums charged to traditional Medicare FFS 
recipients—in 2008, increased spending on MA plans accounted for a large 
portion of the increase in Part B premiums (roughly $3 per month)112—since 
under current law, a portion of Part B cost increases (25%)113 must be 
passed on to recipients in the form of higher premiums. 
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